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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon Eddins appeals from the judgment of conviction and restitution order in 
this case. Mr. Eddins was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault by means of acid, 
with a persistent violator enhancement. He was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen 
years, with six years fixed. He contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct at 
his trial by misrepresenting the facts and appealing to the passions of the jury. That, he 
claims, constitutes fundamental error, over which this Court should vacate his 
conviction. 
He also contends that, because the jury only convicted him of aggravated assault 
because he threatened to use acid, those threats were not the actual or proximate 
cause of any of the losses claimed in restitution. Therefore, he contends that the district 
court erroneously ordered him to pay restitution for the injuries which were not caused 
by his culpable action. As such, this Court should vacate the erroneous restitution 
award. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
When Daniel Hight and Monique Lewis drove toward Ms. Lewis's grandparents' 
house at ten o'clock in the evening, they saw Mr. Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.18, L.20 - p.20, 
L.6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.50, Ls.3-6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, Ls.20-23.) 1 Mr. Eddins was talking with 
1 The transcripts in this case were provided in several separate electronic PDF 
documents. To promote clarity, "Vol. 1 " will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins 
Reporter's Transcript - Towler" which contains the majority of the transcripts from the 
jury trial. "VoI.2" will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins Reporter's Transcript -
Towler II" which contains transcripts from the September 29, 2011, pretrial hearing, 
excerpts from the jury trial Uury instructions, counsels' opening and closing statements). 
"VoI.3" will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins Reporter's Transcript - Carlton" 
which contains the sentencing hearing. 
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Ms. Lewis's uncle in a field across the street from the grandparents' house. (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.i L.23 - p.i69, L.1.) Mr. Hight admitted that "/ just wanted to get out and confront 
him about [an issue between them].,,2 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.2i, Ls.2i-22.) However, he and 
. Lewis decided to drive around the block, rather than stopping at the grandparents' 
house or returning to Mr. Hight's house. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, L.11; Tr., Vo1.2, p.51, Ls.2-
10.) Mr. Eddins, meanwhile, had begun heading down an alleywaY,3 and reached the 
other end as Mr. Hight and Ms. Lewis drove by. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, Ls.10-13; 
Tr., Vo1.1, p.51, Ls.11-14; Tr., Vo1.1, p.170, Ls.9-12.) 
Mr. Hight exited his vehicle and confronted Mr. Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.170, 
Ls.16-20; Tr., Vol.21 , p.21, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Eddins admitted he told Mr. Hight, "back off, 
man, I have acid."4 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Hight, however, testified that he 
could not remember Mr. Eddins saying any such thing. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.7-16.) Nor 
did Mr. Hight remember seeing the bottle that Mr. Eddins was carrying until the 
encounter was over. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Hight and Mr. Eddins disagreed 
over who started the confrontation and what occurred during that encounter. (Compare, 
Tr., Vol. 1 , p.17i, Ls.1-24, with Tr., Vol. 1 , p.22, L.23 - p.24, L.2.) Ms. Lewis was in the 
car throughout the encounter.5 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.52, Ls.23-25.) During that encounter, the 
2 Mr. Eddins claimed that he had paid Mr. Hight for an air conditioner and a camera, 
which Mr. Hight had failed to deliver to him. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.167, LS.20 - p.167, L.i2.) 
3 Mr. Eddins's house was in that direction. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.169, Ls.23-24.) 
4 The bottle recovered from the scene was determined to have acid in it. (Tr., Vol. 1, 
p.130, Ls.11-20.) Mr. Hight claimed to be able to recognize that generic, unmarked, 
white, plastic bottle (see, e.g., State's Exhibits 4 and 5), as one belonging to Mr. Eddins. 
(See TL, Vol. 1 , p.25, Ls.1-B.) 
5 The car was facing away from the encounter and there were no street lights to 
illuminate the confrontation. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.172, Ls.16-20.) The confrontation occurred 
some feet behind the car. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.172, Ls.13-15 (Mr. Eddins testifying it was ten 
feet behind the car); Tr., Vol. 1, p.62, Ls.1-2 (Ms. Lewis testifying it occurred two to three 
feet behind the car).) 
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liquid in Mr. Eddins's bottle was released and got on both Mr. Eddins and Mr. Hight. 
(Tr., Vo1.1, p.24, Ls.9-22; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.i72, Ls.3-B.) Mr. Eddins was able to successfully 
perform first aid on himself, preventing significant damage to himself from the acid, 
although he was not able to open his eyes until the next day. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.155, 
L.2 - p.i56, L.i0; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.i73, Ls.B-i6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.i77, L.6 - p.i7B, L.B.) 
Mr. Hight was not so fortunate. His initial efforts at first aid were unsuccessful. 
(See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.53, Ls.iB-20.) He sought medical attention, and doctors continued to 
flush his eye. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.111, L.21 - p.112, L.i7.) Despite their efforts, Mr. Hight lost 
his left eye. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.1i2, Ls.18-22; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.121, Ls.20-25.) 
The State charged Mr. Eddins with aggravated battery by means of vitriol, acid, 
or other caustic chemical, with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.84-B5.) 
Mr. Eddins took the matter to trial. The jury was instructed on aggravated battery with 
acid, and, at the defense's request, the included offenses of aggravated assault with 
acid, simple battery, and simple assault. (R., pp.263-68.) The jury was instructed that it 
could only reach each subsequent included offense if it acquitted Mr. Eddins of the 
greater offense. (R., pp.265, 267-68.) During her statements to the jury, the prosecutor 
represented that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, L.25; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.148, L.25.) Mr. Hight, however, had testified that he was still able to see 
with his other eye. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still 
see, although he has had to adjust based on the impact to his depth perception).) The 
jury convicted Mr. Eddins of the included offense of aggravated assault, and also found 
the necessary prior convictions to support the alleged enhancement. (R., pp.249-51.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Eddins to a unified term of fifteen years, with six 
years fixed. (R., p.327-29.) The State requested restitution in the amount of $5,241.79 
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for Mr. Hight. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.35, LS.6-1 see Tr., Vo1.3, p.40, Ls.16-18.) Mr. Eddins 
challenged that request because the jury only convicted Mr. Eddins of threatening to 
use acid, but acquitted him of actually using acid to strike Mr. Hight. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.29, 
Ls.4-16.) Therefore, defense counsel argued, any damages relating to the touching of 
Mr. Hight with acid were not caused by Mr. Eddins's culpable conduct (threatening to 
use acid). (Tr., Vol. p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.16.) The district court rejected that argument 
deciding it could order the restitution because the losses "flow[ed] from the criminal 
conduct that Mr. Eddins was found guilty of." (Tr., Vo1.3, p.40, L.23 - p.41, L.1.) 
Accordingly it entered an order of restitution for the amount requested. (R, p.339.) 




1. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting or 
mischaracterizing the evidence in her closing argument. 
2. Whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for damages not caused 




The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Or Mischaracterizing The 
Evidence In Her Closing Argument 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor is not allowed to mischaracterize or misrepresent the evidence 
during her closing argument. She is also not allowed to appeal to the emotion, passion 
or prejudice of the jury. Doing so deprives the defendant of a fair trial and requires that 
the conviction be vacated and a new trial be ordered. Because the prosecutor engaged 
in such conduct during Mr. Eddins's trial, the error is clear from the record, and it 
prejudiced Mr. Eddins, this Court should find fundamental error and vacate Mr. Eddins's 
conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
B. By Representing To The Jury That Mr. Hight Had "Lost His Sense Of Sight" The 
Prosecutor Misrepresented The Evidence And Improperly Appealed To The 
Jurors' Emotions; Mr. Hight Could Still See And Had Full Use Of His Right Eye 
Idaho's appellate courts have clearly held that an attorney "may not misrepresent 
or mischaracterize the evidence" during her closing arguments. State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165 (1980), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981). Those 
closing arguments also may not consist of "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of 
the jury .... " Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. This rule is especially true for prosecutors 
because they: 
too often forget that they are part of the mach inery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give counsel for the 
accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to 
see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
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doing so transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that the defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but 
competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, 
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903). Therefore, where the prosecutor 
fails in that responsibility, she deprives the defendant of a fair trial, tainting the 
subsequent conviction so that it cannot stand. See id.; Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 165. 
Where there is no contemporaneous objection to such misconduct, it will only be 
reviewed for fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). To show 
fundamental error, the appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the error violates one of his 
unwaived constitutional rights, (2) the error is clear from the record, and (3) the error 
prejudiced him. Id. at 228. Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial 
and due process therein. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. 
Prosecutorial misconduct in the closing argument can deprive the defendant of his right 
to a fair trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 
742, 752-54 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 
(1991); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. It is a long-standing rule that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process protections prevent the State from obtaining convictions 
when the prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 
(1967). The protection is not just against wholly-fabricated evidence, but extends to 
arguments which misstate the evidence brought out during the trial. See, e.g., United 
States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fearns, the Seventh Circuit 
ordered a retrial after the prosecutor had tried to bolster the credibility of one of the 
government's witness by telling the jury that he had made a prior consistent statement 
even though no evidence of such a statement had been offered at trial. Id. The 
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Seventh Circuit admonished the prosecutor, describing that behavior as a violation of a 
"fundamental rule, known to every lawyer," and which constituted "gross misconduct." 
Id. at 489. Such misconduct also deprives the defendant of his due process rights. 
State v. Rozencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 131 (Ct. App. 1986). 
In this case, as in Fearns, the prosecutor embellished a fact in argument to 
bolster her case: she told the jury that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight" 
(Tr., VoI.2., p.119, L.2S; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.2S.) This misconduct appears as though it 
may have been intentional because of the catchy rhyme it would plant in the minds of 
the jurors. The rhyme, however, is not a true statement of the evidence elicited during 
the trial. In fact, Mr. Hight testified that he has maintained his sense of sight 
(See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still see, although he 
has had to adjust based on the impact to his depth perception).) Given that the jury 
actually acquitted Mr. Eddins of the aggravated battery, the prosecutor's misstatement 
of the evidence is troubling, as the jurors may have fully acquitted Mr. Eddins absent the 
prosecutor's inaccurate appeal to their emotions. Therefore, the error is fundamental 
and impacts at least one of Mr. Eddins's unwaived constitutional rights, satisfying first 
prong of the Perry test is met Compare Fearns, SO 1 F .2d at 488-89. 
The error is also plain from the face of the record. The prosecutor told the jury 
that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." (Tr., VoL2., p.119, L.2S; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, 
L.2S.) However, Mr. Hight retained the use of his right eye, meaning he still had his 
sense of sight. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still see, 
although he has had to adjust based on the impact to his depth perception).) As such, 
the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense sight" was blatantly wrong, 
and could only serve to appeal to the passions of the jury. 
8 
The error prejudiced Mr. Eddins. The jury actually acquitted him of the charge of 
aggravated battery, but ultimately convicted him of the crime of aggravated assault, 
even though Mr. Hight's own testimony disproved one of the elements of that offense. 6 
(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.29, LS.7-14 (Mr. Hight testifying that he did not hear Mr. Eddins 
make any threat).) Because of this notable inconsistency in the evidence, the record 
suggests that the jury's conviction was impacted by factors other than the evidence, 
such as the prosecutor's misconduct, in its decision to convict Mr. Hight. As such, all 
three elements of the Perry test are present and this Court should vacate Mr. Eddins's 
conviction based on the prosecutor's blatant misrepresentation of the facts in this case. 
II. 
The District Court Improperly Awarded Restitution For Damages Not Caused By 
Mr. Eddins's Culpable Conduct 
A Introduction 
In order for a restitution award to be proper, it must be for damages actually and 
proximately caused by the defendant's culpable action. In this case, given the factual 
findings made by the jury, the only culpable action for which it could have convicted 
Mr. Eddins was making a threat. Since the threat-the words themselves-are 
incapable of causing physical injury, the restitution award for losses related to 
6 When a conviction is for assault-by-threat, the victim must have a well-founded fear 
arising from that threat. See State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); 
State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 654 (Ct. App. 2004). That is difficult for the State to prove 
when the victim says, under oath, that he did not actually hear the alleged threat. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.7-16.) Mr. Hight did testify that he saw Mr. Eddins start swinging his 
arm toward him. (Tr., Vol. 1 , pAO, Ls.5-6.) However, he testified he thought it was just a 
punch; he did not see the bottle until after the encounter was over. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, 
Ls.9-10; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.22-24.) 
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Mr. Hight's physical injury is erroneous. This Court should vacate the improper 
restitution award. 
B. Based On The Jury's Findings Of Fact, Mr. Eddins Could Have Only, Rationally 
Been Convicted Of Aggravated Assault By Threat, And That Threat Cannot 
Be Said To Be The Actual Or Proximate Cause Of The Damages Awarded As 
Restitution In Th is Case 
Idaho courts are only authorized to award restitution for losses and injuries which 
are the result of the defendant's criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i); 
State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hughey v. United States, 
495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990); see also State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372 (Ct. App. 2007); 
State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886-87 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 
868, 870 (Ct. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1995). "Criminal conduct" is limited to only those actions for which 
the defendant is found guilty. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373. It is also sometimes referred to 
as the "culpable act." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007). Therefore, Idaho 
law prohibits restitution for damages not caused by the defendant's culpable act. 
Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372 (citing I.e. § 19-5304(1 )(e)). 
To determine whether damages are caused by a culpable act, Idaho employs a 
tort law causation analysis. State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011); Lampien, 148 
Idaho at 374; State v. Nienbug, 153 Idaho 491,495 (Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied. Such 
causation analysis is more specific than the district court's "flows from" analysis. (See 
Tr., Vo1.3, pAD, L.23 - pA1! L.1.) Rather, the district court must be able to find that the 
particular event produced a particular consequence (actual cause) and whether the 
harm was reasonably foreseeable from the action and was not interrupted by an 
intervening, superseding cause (proximate cause). Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. ('Actual 
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cause is a factual question of whether a particular event produced a particular 
consequence." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875 (2009) (quoting Newberry v. 
Martens, '142 Idaho 284, 288 (2005)). Similarly, "proximate cause is one of fact and 
almost always for the jury." Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875 (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 
Idaho 617, 619-20 (1980)). Therefore, it is necessary to know what facts the jury 
found in order to determine whether the culpable act caused the damage pursued in 
restitution. See id. 
The jury's findings of fact in this case are evident given the charges it considered 
and the verdict it returned. The jury was instructed, in regard to the aggravated battery 
charge, that the State was required to prove: (1) on or about July 11, 2010, (2) in 
the State of Idaho, (3) Mr. Eddins committed a battery upon Mr. Hight,? (4) by striking 
Mr. Hight in the face with a plastic container containing a corrosive acid and/or caustic 
chemical, and (5) when doing so, Mr. Eddins used any vitriol, corrosive acid, or a 
caustic chemical of any nature. (R., p.263.) Contrarily, to commit aggravated assault, 
the jury was instructed that the State only had to prove: (1) on or about July 11, 2010, 
(2) in the State of Idaho, (3) Mr. Eddins committed an assault upon Mr. Hight,8 (4) with 
any vitriol, corrosive acid, or caustic chemical of any kind. (R., p.266.) 
7 To commit the battery required by the third element, the jury was instructed that the 
State was required to prove that Mr. Eddins (1) willfully and unlawfully used force or 
violence upon the person of Mr. Hight, or (2) he actually, intentionally, and unlawfully 
touched or struck Mr. Hight against Mr. Hight's will, or (3) he unlawfully and intentionally 
caused bodily harm to Mr. Hight. (R., p.264.) 
8 To commit the assault identified in the third element, the jury was instructed that the 
State was required to prove Mr. Eddins either (1) unlawfully attempted, with the 
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another (hereinafter, assault-
by-attempt), or (2) he intentionally and unlawfully threatened by word or act to do 
violence to the person of Mr. Hight, with the apparent ability to do so, and does some 
act which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent 
(hereinafter, assault-by-threat). (R., p.267.) 
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The only difference between those two offenses is the culpable act; for battery, 
Mr. Eddins had to actually and intentionally strike Mr. Hight with acid, whereas, for 
assault, he needed only to try to strike Mr. Hight with acid or threaten to strike Mr. Hight 
with acid. (Compare R, p.263 with R, p.266.) Additionally, the jury was instructed that 
it could not consider the aggravated assault charge without first acquitting Mr. Eddins on 
the aggravated battery charge. (R, p.265 ("If your unanimous verdict is that the 
defendant is not guilty of Aggravated battery, you must acquit him of that charge. In 
that event, you must next consider the included offense of Aggravated Assault.").) The 
jury is presumed to follow the jury instructions. 9 State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718 
(2011). 
The result, then, of the jury's verdict to acquit Mr. Eddins of the aggravated 
battery, but convict him of the aggravated assault, is that Mr. Eddins did not intend to 
strike Mr. Hight with the acid. (See R, p.251; compare R, p.263 with R, p.266.) 
Furthermore, it is nonsensical to say that this jury convicted Mr. Eddins on the assault-
by-attempt theory because, if Mr. Eddins's attempt was criminal, it actually succeeded, 
and therefore, the jury (following the instructions not to compromise) would have 
convicted him of the competed action. iO It is not possible to find that a rational jury 
would convict on the assault-by-attempt theory when the attempt succeeds, especially 
where that same jury already acquitted the defendant in regard to the successful act. 
9 As a result, it must also be presumed that the jury did not reach its verdict by 
compromise. (R, p.277 ("Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by 
lot, or by compromise.").) 
10 The only scenario based on these facts and jury findings that would allow for a 
conviction of assault-by-attempt after the acquittal of aggravated battery would be if 
Mr. Eddins had intentionally tried to throw the acid on Mr. Hight, but missed entirely. 
Since the acid actually hit Mr. Hight, the only rational conclusion is that the jury found 
Mr. Eddins did not try to get the acid on Mr. Hight. 
12 
Compare State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663, 665-66 (et. App. 2004) (defining attempt 
as "to make an effort to do, accomplish, solve or effect"). Therefore, the only act which 
the rational jury could deem culpable based on these factual findings is the assault-by-
threat. 11 However, such aggravated assaults are accomplished without actually causing 
physical injury. See, e.g., State v. Matthewson, 93 Idaho 769, 771-72 (1970) (finding 
that the defendant had committed aggravated assault when he made a threat while 
pointing a loaded gun at the victim). Therefore, the only culpable act for which 
Mr. Eddins could possibly have been convicted was making a threat with the apparent 
ability to carry out that threat. 
That threat cannot be said to be the actual or proximate cause of Mr. Hight's 
physical injuries. Just because a person makes a threat does not mean that the threat 
will be followed by action. See Matthewson, 93 Idaho at 771 At most, the only thing 
that a threat can actually cause is fear in the other person. The threat-the words 
themselves-did not cause the damage to Mr. Hight's eye, nor is it foreseeable that the 
words spoken will be capable of impacting the physical world. 12 Therefore, the losses 
associated with the treatment of Mr. Hight's eye were not actually or proximately caused 
by Mr. Eddins's culpable conduct, and thus, are not recoverable in restitution. I.C. § 19-
11 The assault-by-threat theory is, at least, potentially grounded in the evidence 
presented. Mr. Eddins testified that he told Mr. Hight to "back off, man, I have acid." 
(Tr., Vo/'1, p.171 Ls.6-8; but see Tr., Vo/'1, p.29, LS.7-14 (Mr. Hight testifying that he did 
not hear Mr. Eddins make any such statement).) Mr. Eddins also had a bottle which 
contained acid. (See, e.g., Tr., Vo/'1, p.130, Ls.11-20.) Therefore, the jury may have 
concluded that the statement "I have acid" constituted a threat, even though Mr. Hight 
did not hear it, and the fact that the bottle had acid in it gave Mr. Eddins the apparent 
ability to use that acid. (Compare R., p.267.) 
12 No matter what events could possibly flow from that culpable act, the causation is 
limited to what the culpable act itself can cause, not what mayor may not be somehow 
tangentially related to that act down the line. 
13 
5304(1)(e); Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602; Nienburg, 153 Idaho 
at 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Eddins respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand his 
case for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the 
improper restitution awards ordered by the district court. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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